Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
This is an advisory for a potential polynomial Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the RegexCriterion
class. This class compiles and evaluates an unvalidated, user-supplied regular expression against the identifier of an Identifiable
object via Pattern.compile(regex).matcher(id).find()
.
To trigger polynomial ReDoS in RegexCriterion
, two attacker-controlled conditions must be met:
- Control over the regex input passed into the constructor:
- Example: An attacker supplies a malicious pattern such as
(.*a){10000}
.
- Control or influence over the output of
Identifiable.getId()
:
- Example: A long string like
"aaaa...!"
that forces excessive backtracking.
If both conditions are satisfied, a malicious actor can cause significant CPU exhaustion through repeated or recursive filter(...)
calls — especially if performed over large network models or filtering operations.
While this class does not handle file or memory data directly, its reliance on untrusted regular expressions and potentially attacker-controlled identifiers makes it vulnerable to polynomial ReDoS under the right conditions. This risk is amplified when the library is used in dynamic or scriptable environments where external users control either criterion construction or network object identifiers.
Although not as dangerous as catastrophic exponential ReDoS, the polynomial pattern still induces significant performance
degradation as input size increases.
Am I impacted?
Since RegexCriterion
are used to define contingencies or limit reductions, you are vulnerable if:
- you allow untrusted users to define contingency lists or limit reductions using this criterion;
- OR you load untrusted contingencies or limit reductions files
AND use them with a network containing untrusted identifiers.
Patches
com.powsybl:powsybl-iidm-criteria:6.7.2 and higher
References
powsybl-core v6.7.2
References
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
This is an advisory for a potential polynomial Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the
RegexCriterion
class. This class compiles and evaluates an unvalidated, user-supplied regular expression against the identifier of anIdentifiable
object viaPattern.compile(regex).matcher(id).find()
.To trigger polynomial ReDoS in
RegexCriterion
, two attacker-controlled conditions must be met:(.*a){10000}
.Identifiable.getId()
:"aaaa...!"
that forces excessive backtracking.If both conditions are satisfied, a malicious actor can cause significant CPU exhaustion through repeated or recursive
filter(...)
calls — especially if performed over large network models or filtering operations.While this class does not handle file or memory data directly, its reliance on untrusted regular expressions and potentially attacker-controlled identifiers makes it vulnerable to polynomial ReDoS under the right conditions. This risk is amplified when the library is used in dynamic or scriptable environments where external users control either criterion construction or network object identifiers.
Although not as dangerous as catastrophic exponential ReDoS, the polynomial pattern still induces significant performance
degradation as input size increases.
Am I impacted?
Since
RegexCriterion
are used to define contingencies or limit reductions, you are vulnerable if:AND use them with a network containing untrusted identifiers.
Patches
com.powsybl:powsybl-iidm-criteria:6.7.2 and higher
References
powsybl-core v6.7.2
References