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tacaswell
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Apply recommended hardening steps including:

  • pinning to a SHA any actions used
  • not persisting the read token on checkout
  • setting the default permissions
  • adding a depandabot file for GHA

This eliminates the possibility of a tag being changed under
us.
This eliminates the possibility of a tag being changed under
us.
May include:

- Avoids risky string interpolation.
- Prevents checkout premissions from leaking
Reduces risk of arbitrary code is run by attacker.
Reduces risk of arbitrary code is run by attacker.
@@ -5,8 +5,13 @@ on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write

steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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Not pinned.

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No actions are pinned in this file.

@tacaswell
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The tool I used to find un-pinned actions (zizmor) does not flag the "official" action/xyz actions.

I suspect the logic is if someone manages to compromise GH there are more direct ways to cause trouble than funny side-band attacks via GHA.

Co-authored-by: Elliott Sales de Andrade <quantum.analyst@gmail.com>
@QuLogic
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QuLogic commented Jul 24, 2025

I think you need to run with the pedantic persona to catch those.

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2 participants